Minneapolis, Minnesota
21 February 2014
by Doug Mann
This afternoon, about 4:15 PM I filed a petition in the Minnesota Supreme
Court requesting a discretionary review of the Court of Appeals decision in In
re Doug Mann, case no. A14-0026.
The Court of Appeals dismissed my appeal of the Hennepin County District
Court decision in Doug Mann vs. Minneapolis City Council, on procedural
grounds, because I requested an writ of mandamus rather than a writ of error
(an ordinary appeal). The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled in the past that a
writ of mandamus will not issue if an ordinary appeal is available. The
mandamus statute allows a writ of mandamus to issue only if there is no other
"adequate" remedy.
In my petition for Supreme Court review I argue that, under the
circumstances, an ordinary appeal was not be an "adequate" remedy, in part
because of a pending sale of Stadium bonds that provided the City Council
grounds to ask the Court to require me to place a $10 million bet on the
outcome of the legal process.
The other requirement for granting a writ of mandamus directed at a lower
court is a showing that the District Court judge had committed an abuse of
legal discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the law is incorrectly
applied in a case where the law, if correctly applied, would produce a
different conclusion. The Court of Appeals did not rule on this issue, nor did
the City Attorney did not offer a rebuttal to my arguments on this issue.
I allege that the Minneapolis City Council has a duty to refer approval
of the use of more than $10 million of "city resources" for the Vikings Stadium
project. The District Court decision established that local option sales taxes
authorized by the Stadium Act of 2012 are "city resources," and a charter
provision that requires a referendum applies, but that the Act "preempted" the
City Charter provision.
Attached are pdf files of the Petition for Supreme Court review, the
District Court decision being appealed, and the Petition and memoranda that I
filed in the Court of appeals on the 9th and 21st of January. Below are the two
main section of the Petition for Supreme Court review.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1) Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Court of
Appeals as an appeal of the decision of Hennepin County District Court in Mann
vs. Minneapolis City Council. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on
the grounds that a writ of mandamus cannot be substituted for a writ of error,
and that the petitioner failed to show that a writ of error was not an adequate
legal remedy.
2) The Court of Appeals decision did not address the question of whether
the District Court had correctly applied the law in determining whether the
Minneapolis City Council had a duty to follow a Minneapolis City Charter
provision that requires a referendum to approve the use of more than $10
million in City Resources for a professional sports facility. The City Council
approved special legislation authorizing the imposition of local sales taxes to
raise more than $10 million for the construction and operation of a new Vikings
Stadium, specifically Article 3 of the Stadium Act, 2012 Minnesota session
laws, chapter 299.
3) The District Court decision voided language in Article 3, section 4
of the Stadium Act, which states that local sales taxes authorized by the
Stadium Act are deemed to not be "city resources" within the meaning of any law
or charter provision. The District Court determined that these local sales
taxes are "city resources" within the meaning of chapter 15, section 13
(section 13) of the Minneapolis City Charter, and that section 13 applies to
approval of the Article 3 of the Stadium Act.
4) The District Court also determined that Article 3, section 4 of
the Stadium act preempts Section 13. On appeal, the principal legal issue
raised by the Petitioner in In re Doug Mann is whether Article 3 section 4, and
provisions of the Stadium Act inseparably connected to it would be
unconstitutional, after language about the local sales taxes authorized by the
Act being deemed to not be "city resources" was voided by the decision. Did the
District Court correctly interpret the law in conformance with canons of
interpretation set forth in Minn. Statutes Chapter 645, that legislative intent
controls (section 16), that it can not be presumed that the legislature would
enact provisions of a law inseparably connected to voided provisions (section
20), and that it cannot be presumed that the legislature intends to enact
legislation that is unconstitutional (section 17)? Would the use of city
resources to pay for state-issued bonds violate Article X, section 1 of the
Minnesota Constitution?
5) The appeal of the District Court decision by Petitioner in Mann vs.
Minneapolis City Council posed a risk of increased costs for a $400 million
real estate development sponsored by the City of Minneapolis that is financed
in part by the sale of state appropriation bonds for construction of the
Vikings Stadium. Federal Securities and Exchange Commission rules require
disclosure of any pending lawsuit, such as the appeal of Mann vs. Minneapolis
City Council, which could threaten any source of revenue to pay principal and
interest on the bonds. The bond sale was very long overdue when it was
eventually scheduled to start on January 13, 2014, exactly 60 days after the
filing of the District Court decision in Mann vs. Minneapolis City Council.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
In re Doug Mann, case # A14-0026, petitioner alleges that the District
Court judge had incorrectly interpreted and applied the law, which is an abuse
of judicial discretion. Petitioner stands on arguments in the memorandum in
support of the petition and the demurrer filed in the Court of Appeals on
January 21, 2014.
The other requirement for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is that the
petitioner has no other adequate remedy. An ordinary appeal was available,
however that remedy was not an "adequate" remedy for the petitioner, for the
following reasons:
1) The original District Court lawsuit was filed on July 16, 2013 in the
public interest to enforce a provision of the Minneapolis City Charter.
2) Under the circumstances, an ordinary appeal of the District Court
Decision in Mann vs. City Council was not an "adequate remedy" for the
petitioner because a ruling on the merits of the case would not occur unless
the petitioner first placed a multi-million dollar bet on the outcome because
of a pending bond sale.
3) A long delay by an injured party in seeking a legal remedy may
justify the posting of a surety bond on grounds of Laches. However Laches is
not, by itself, a valid defense for the unlawful conduct that caused the
injury. In this case, the relief prayed for can be granted.
4) An extraordinary remedy may be considered as an alternative to an
ordinary remedy in the interests of justice. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, the Texas Supreme Court wrote:
The other requirement Prudential must meet is to show that it has no adequate
remedy by appeal. [Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d at 840] The operative word,
"adequate," has no comprehensive definition; it is a proxy for the careful
balance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when appellate courts
will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts. .
. [In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124 (2004) Page 8
WestlawNext]
. . . Although this Court has tried to give more concrete direction for
determining the availability of mandamus review, rigid rules are necessarily
inconsistent with the flexibility that is the remedy's principal virtue. Thus,
we wrote in Walker v. Packer that "an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely
because it may involve more expense or delay than obtaining an extraordinary
writ." [Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840] While this is certainly true, the word
"merely" carries heavy freight. In In re E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., we
concluded that defending the claims of more than 8,000 plaintiffs in litigation
that would last for years was not mere expense and delay, and that mandamus
review of the denial of duPont's special appearance was justified, even though
dePont could eventually appeal and did not appear to be in any danger of
succumbing to the burden of litigation. . . Id
These cases, among a great many others that could be cited, serve to illustrate
that whether an appellate remedy is "adequate" so as to preclude mandamus
review depends heavily on the circumstances presented and is better guided by
general principals than by simple rules. Id
". . . Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is largely
controlled by equitable principles." Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera 858 S.W.2d
366, 367 (Tex. 1993)
-Doug Mann, Minneapolis School Board candidate, resident of Folwell
neighborhood, north side of Minneapolis
21 February 2014
by Doug Mann
This afternoon, about 4:15 PM I filed a petition in the Minnesota Supreme
Court requesting a discretionary review of the Court of Appeals decision in In
re Doug Mann, case no. A14-0026.
The Court of Appeals dismissed my appeal of the Hennepin County District
Court decision in Doug Mann vs. Minneapolis City Council, on procedural
grounds, because I requested an writ of mandamus rather than a writ of error
(an ordinary appeal). The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled in the past that a
writ of mandamus will not issue if an ordinary appeal is available. The
mandamus statute allows a writ of mandamus to issue only if there is no other
"adequate" remedy.
In my petition for Supreme Court review I argue that, under the
circumstances, an ordinary appeal was not be an "adequate" remedy, in part
because of a pending sale of Stadium bonds that provided the City Council
grounds to ask the Court to require me to place a $10 million bet on the
outcome of the legal process.
The other requirement for granting a writ of mandamus directed at a lower
court is a showing that the District Court judge had committed an abuse of
legal discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the law is incorrectly
applied in a case where the law, if correctly applied, would produce a
different conclusion. The Court of Appeals did not rule on this issue, nor did
the City Attorney did not offer a rebuttal to my arguments on this issue.
I allege that the Minneapolis City Council has a duty to refer approval
of the use of more than $10 million of "city resources" for the Vikings Stadium
project. The District Court decision established that local option sales taxes
authorized by the Stadium Act of 2012 are "city resources," and a charter
provision that requires a referendum applies, but that the Act "preempted" the
City Charter provision.
Attached are pdf files of the Petition for Supreme Court review, the
District Court decision being appealed, and the Petition and memoranda that I
filed in the Court of appeals on the 9th and 21st of January. Below are the two
main section of the Petition for Supreme Court review.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1) Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Court of
Appeals as an appeal of the decision of Hennepin County District Court in Mann
vs. Minneapolis City Council. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on
the grounds that a writ of mandamus cannot be substituted for a writ of error,
and that the petitioner failed to show that a writ of error was not an adequate
legal remedy.
2) The Court of Appeals decision did not address the question of whether
the District Court had correctly applied the law in determining whether the
Minneapolis City Council had a duty to follow a Minneapolis City Charter
provision that requires a referendum to approve the use of more than $10
million in City Resources for a professional sports facility. The City Council
approved special legislation authorizing the imposition of local sales taxes to
raise more than $10 million for the construction and operation of a new Vikings
Stadium, specifically Article 3 of the Stadium Act, 2012 Minnesota session
laws, chapter 299.
3) The District Court decision voided language in Article 3, section 4
of the Stadium Act, which states that local sales taxes authorized by the
Stadium Act are deemed to not be "city resources" within the meaning of any law
or charter provision. The District Court determined that these local sales
taxes are "city resources" within the meaning of chapter 15, section 13
(section 13) of the Minneapolis City Charter, and that section 13 applies to
approval of the Article 3 of the Stadium Act.
4) The District Court also determined that Article 3, section 4 of
the Stadium act preempts Section 13. On appeal, the principal legal issue
raised by the Petitioner in In re Doug Mann is whether Article 3 section 4, and
provisions of the Stadium Act inseparably connected to it would be
unconstitutional, after language about the local sales taxes authorized by the
Act being deemed to not be "city resources" was voided by the decision. Did the
District Court correctly interpret the law in conformance with canons of
interpretation set forth in Minn. Statutes Chapter 645, that legislative intent
controls (section 16), that it can not be presumed that the legislature would
enact provisions of a law inseparably connected to voided provisions (section
20), and that it cannot be presumed that the legislature intends to enact
legislation that is unconstitutional (section 17)? Would the use of city
resources to pay for state-issued bonds violate Article X, section 1 of the
Minnesota Constitution?
5) The appeal of the District Court decision by Petitioner in Mann vs.
Minneapolis City Council posed a risk of increased costs for a $400 million
real estate development sponsored by the City of Minneapolis that is financed
in part by the sale of state appropriation bonds for construction of the
Vikings Stadium. Federal Securities and Exchange Commission rules require
disclosure of any pending lawsuit, such as the appeal of Mann vs. Minneapolis
City Council, which could threaten any source of revenue to pay principal and
interest on the bonds. The bond sale was very long overdue when it was
eventually scheduled to start on January 13, 2014, exactly 60 days after the
filing of the District Court decision in Mann vs. Minneapolis City Council.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
In re Doug Mann, case # A14-0026, petitioner alleges that the District
Court judge had incorrectly interpreted and applied the law, which is an abuse
of judicial discretion. Petitioner stands on arguments in the memorandum in
support of the petition and the demurrer filed in the Court of Appeals on
January 21, 2014.
The other requirement for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is that the
petitioner has no other adequate remedy. An ordinary appeal was available,
however that remedy was not an "adequate" remedy for the petitioner, for the
following reasons:
1) The original District Court lawsuit was filed on July 16, 2013 in the
public interest to enforce a provision of the Minneapolis City Charter.
2) Under the circumstances, an ordinary appeal of the District Court
Decision in Mann vs. City Council was not an "adequate remedy" for the
petitioner because a ruling on the merits of the case would not occur unless
the petitioner first placed a multi-million dollar bet on the outcome because
of a pending bond sale.
3) A long delay by an injured party in seeking a legal remedy may
justify the posting of a surety bond on grounds of Laches. However Laches is
not, by itself, a valid defense for the unlawful conduct that caused the
injury. In this case, the relief prayed for can be granted.
4) An extraordinary remedy may be considered as an alternative to an
ordinary remedy in the interests of justice. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, the Texas Supreme Court wrote:
The other requirement Prudential must meet is to show that it has no adequate
remedy by appeal. [Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d at 840] The operative word,
"adequate," has no comprehensive definition; it is a proxy for the careful
balance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when appellate courts
will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts. .
. [In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124 (2004) Page 8
WestlawNext]
. . . Although this Court has tried to give more concrete direction for
determining the availability of mandamus review, rigid rules are necessarily
inconsistent with the flexibility that is the remedy's principal virtue. Thus,
we wrote in Walker v. Packer that "an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely
because it may involve more expense or delay than obtaining an extraordinary
writ." [Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840] While this is certainly true, the word
"merely" carries heavy freight. In In re E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., we
concluded that defending the claims of more than 8,000 plaintiffs in litigation
that would last for years was not mere expense and delay, and that mandamus
review of the denial of duPont's special appearance was justified, even though
dePont could eventually appeal and did not appear to be in any danger of
succumbing to the burden of litigation. . . Id
These cases, among a great many others that could be cited, serve to illustrate
that whether an appellate remedy is "adequate" so as to preclude mandamus
review depends heavily on the circumstances presented and is better guided by
general principals than by simple rules. Id
". . . Although mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is largely
controlled by equitable principles." Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera 858 S.W.2d
366, 367 (Tex. 1993)
-Doug Mann, Minneapolis School Board candidate, resident of Folwell
neighborhood, north side of Minneapolis
